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RECENT DECISIONS
Insurance-The Effect of an Insurer Filing the SR-21 Form-
The defendant insured permitted one Smith, a former employee, to
utilize his garage and equipment in order to paint the car of another.
En route home, Smith collided with the plaintiff. Upon notification
of the accident by the insured, defendant insurer (Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co.) filed an SR-21 (Safety Responsibility) form with the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in which the following question was
answered in the affirmative: "Does this policy apply to the above
operator in the above accident ?" Considerably later, but prior to trial,
the insurer attempted without success to change the answer to that
question. From an order denying a summary judgment, the defendants,
insured and insurer, appealed. Held: Reversed as to the defendant
insured, affirmed as to the defendant insurer. The court negated the
existence of any agency, employment, or partnership relationship be-
tween the insured and Smith, the operator of the vehicle. Therefore,
in view of the absence of any relationship upon which to ground lia-
bility, the court held that the insured was entitled to a summary judg-
ment. However, as to the defendant insurer, the SR-21 form clearly
constituted an admission against interest. Hence, the motion for a
summary judgment by the insurer was correctly denied by the trial
court. Laughnan v. Griffiths, 271 Wis. 247, 73 N.W. 2d 587 (1955).
The Laughnan case was followed a few months later by Prisuda v.
General Casualty Co. of America, 272 Wis. 41, 74 N.W. 2d 777
(1956). In this case the insured's son permitted a friend, one George
Rogers, to operate the car although the insured had expressly directed
.the son not to permit anyone else to drive. While Rogers was thus
operating the vehicle, the accident occurred. The defendant's local
agent sent a report of the accident to the home office, and the latter
filed the SR-21 form mistakenly stating that the operator was covered
by the policy at the time of the accident. Three years later, the de-
fendant attempted to modify the form in this particular without avail.
The plaintiff tried to introduce the SR-21 as an admission, but the
trial court excluded it upon the ground that "it is in the nature of a
statement of financial responsibility and does not alter the terms of the
insurance contract."' However, the lower court decided that there was
an implied consent for Rogers to drive, which put him within the
coverage of the policy and upon that theory held the defendant liable.
Held: Reversed. Rogers was not within the coverage of the policy
since the insured had in no way consented to his driving, which in fact
was outside the use granted to her son. Nonetheless, the plaintiff was
entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in refusing to admit
the SR-21 form into evidence as an admission against the insurer.
1 Prisuda v. General Casualty Co. of America, supra, at 51.
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. Section 85.09 of the Wisconsin Statutes has three principal com-
ponents.2 Subsections (1)-(4) define terms and grant to the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles certain powers and duties.
The second portion is contained in subsections (5)-(16), known
as the Safety Responsibility Law, and contains the provisions involved
in the present consideration. Every state in the union has some
variety of a Safety Responsibility Law, and 41 states have provisions
substantially similar to those of Wisconsin.3  The general purpose
of the law is to require the negligent operator of a motor vehicle to
provide compensation for the injured party, for the failure of which
the Commissioner 4 will revoke his operator's license and certificate
of registration.5 This purpose is sought to be attained by requiring the
Commissioner, within 60 days after receiving a report of an accident
resulting in death, bodily injury, or property damage in excess of
$100.00, to revoke the operator's licenses of both drivers, and the
certificate of registration of the owners, unless the owner or the opera-
tor, or both, deposit with the Commissioner a bond to insure payment
of the damage occasioned by the accident. There is, however, one
pertinent exception-if the owner or operator has automobile liability
insurance that satisfies specified requirements, then the insured need
not post the previously mentioned bond; instead, the insurer files the
SR-21 form. The SR-21 form is a standard form, prescribed by the
Commissioner in accordance with the authority vested in him under
Sec. 85.09(2), and contains two significant questions which the insurer
must answer: 1) Does this policy apply to the above owner in above
accident? 2) Does this policy apply to the above operator in above
accident ?
Subsections (17)-(29) comprise the Financial Responsibility Law,
and in essence provide that in order to re-acquire a license and registra-
tion that has been suspended, the applicant must furnish proof of his
financial responsibility for the future.
There is considerable speculation and interest as to the precise
effect of these dceisions upon the automobile liability insurers of this
state. An attempt to intelligently predict the impact of the present cases
upon insurance practice must obviously be prefaced by an understand-
ing of the basis upon which the court predicated its pronouncement.
2 For a brief history and discussion of the Safety Responsibility Law, as well as
some interesting pre-Laughnan speculation, see: Bjork, 26 Wis. BAR BULL.
No. 3, p. 21. As to the constitutionality of the Safety Responsibility Law, see:
35 A.L.R. 2d 1021, Automobiles-Financial Responsibility, superseding 115
A.L.R. 1376; and State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953).
3 State v. Stehlek, supra, note 2.
4 As to the Commissioner's duty to suspend being mandatory, see. State v.
Stehlek, supra, note 2.
Laughnan v. Griffiths, supra.
[Vol. 40
RECENT DECISIONS
Unfortunately, this requisite information must itself be the product of
speculation.
That the form constitutes an admission against interest can scarcely
be doubted in view of the court's express statement in the Laughnan
case,6 and the reversal in Prisuda upon this very ground. There would
seem to be little basis to criticize the court upon this declaration, since
admissions are merely voluntary statements or acknowledgments made
by a party to the action, as to the existence of a material fact that is
against the interest of the declarant.7 The use of an admission is not
limited to impeaching purposes via the prior inconsistent statement
approach, but may also be introduced as substantive evidence of the
facts contained therein.8 However, admissions are merely evidence,
which may be weak or strong depending upon the circumstances of
the case, and as such may be rebutted by the party against whom they
were used.9 In both cases, the statement on the SR-21 admitting
coverage as to the operator was filed by mistake, proof of which
should be fairly effective to neutralize the effect of the admission.
Realizing this, the injured party (respondent) in the Laughnan case
contended that the form constituted more than a mere admission. The
court did not directly answer the contention, but in some very interest-
ing dicta they stated that:
".... an automobile liability insurance company can make itself
liable on a policy issued by it where, after investigating the
facts, it, acting through a duly authorized agent or employee,
voluntarily files with the Commissioner an SR-21 form coverage
as to the accident described in such SR-21 intending to be bound
thereby, even though without the filing of the SR-21 there might
not be liability."10
Hence, it would seem that in effect the court does agree that it con-
stitutes more than an admission-which makes the question now: how
much more?
The question presented by these cases has, with but one exception,
never been handled at the appellate level. Consequently, similar cases
in sister states can scarcely be called upon to provide an explanation
for the court's conclusion. Nowhere in either decision does the court
make any mention of waiver or estoppel, notwithstanding the fact that
the litigants in both cases devoted a substantial part of their argument
6 "We consider that the last sentence of the above quoted subsection (Sec.
85.09(11)) clearly recognizes that an SR-21 form may be admissible as an
admission against interest on the part of the company which has filed the
same." Laughnan v. Griffiths, supra, at 259. (parenthesis added).
721 C.J.S. §270.
sLeslie v. Knudson, 205 Wis. 517, 238 N.W. 397 (1931), cited in Frawley v.
Kittel, 254 Wis. 432, 37 N.W.2d 57 (1948).
9 Levandowski v. Study, 249 Wis. 421, 25 N.W.2d 59 (1946).10 Laughnan v. Griffiths, supra, at 259.
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to this precise possibility. Nonetheless, a brief consideration of these
doctrines is warranted by the likelihood that the court was tacitly
guided by these equitable principles.
By definition, a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right;" or more graphically stated, waiver is the judicial doctrine that
within certain limits " ... one shall not be permitted to blow hot, then
with advantage to himself turn and blow cold. . . ."' However, full
knowledge of the material facts is a prerequisite to waiver,1 3 and
certainly the insurers in the cases at hand did not possess this qualifi-
cation. But, as stated by the court in Pabst Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee:14
"It is suggested that there can be no waiver without intent
to waive based on knowledge of the facts. True, but one is pre-
sumed to know that which in contemplation of law he ought to
know, and one is presumed to waive that which is necessarily
implied from his conduct. Constructive as well as actual knowl-
edge of the facts, and implied as well as express intent, satisfies
the prime essential of a conclusive waiver."
Hence, it would appear to be a judicial question in the last analysis
as to whether or not the insurer ought to know sufficient facts so as
to be able to determine coverage before filing the SR-21 form, and
these decisions impliedly at least suggest that the insurance company
does in fact have a duty to ascertain these facts. In view of the fact
that the insurer has 60 days from the filing of the accident report in
which to file the SR-21 form, and in addition can revoke the form
within 30 days from the filing thereof,15 it would be difficult to contend
that this would be too harsh a requirement to impose upon the insur-
ance company.
Aside from knowledge, there is the further obstacle of an inten-
tional relinquishment before a waiver can develop. But, as indicated
in the Pabst case, a person is in effect presumed to intend the ordinary
consequences of his act.'6 Application of this rule to the present situ-
ation might well prompt the court to read the requisite element of
intent from the act of filing by the insurer.'
11 Swedish American Nat. Bank v. Koebernick, 136 Wis. 473, 117 N.W. 1020
(1908); Pfuehler v. General Casualty Ins. Co., 239 Wis. 30, 300 N.W. 469
(1941).
12 Pabst Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 105 N.W. 563 (1905).
13 Smeesters v. New Denmark M.H.F. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 41, 187 N.W. 986 (1922).
14 Supra, note 12.
15 Prisuda v. General Casualty Co. of America, supra, at 46.
16 Swedish American Nat. Bank v. Koebernick, supra, note 11.
17 As stated by Justice Currie in a concurring opinion to the Prisuda case: "The
Safety-Responsibility Law and not the secret intention of the insurance com-
pany, which has voluntary filed an SR-21, must govern the legal effect of such
filing. The words 'intending to be bound thereby' of the Laughnan case should
be interpreted as meaning no more than that the company files the SR-21 for
the purpose of complying with the provision of section 85.09(5) (d), Stats. A
mistaken idea of what the legal consequences are which may result from such
[Vol. 40
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Waiver seems to afford a plausible solution .to the judicial thinking
behind the type of cases which have faced the court to date as regards
the effect of filing the SR-21. The question than arises: Would the
result remain the same if the insurer filed the form in reliance on the
insured's misrepresentation either as to the facts in the accident, or
as to facts upon which the company issued the policy?
The only other case dealing with the effect of filing the form arose
in Iowa,'1 a state with substantially the same Safety Responsibiilty
Law as Wisconsin. In that case, the insured stated to the insurer, in
applying for an automobile liability policy, that his operator's license
had never been revoked and that he had never had a policy of this type
cancelled, both of which statements were knowingly false. In a de-
claratory action brought by the insurance company against the injured
party among others, the court stated that waiver was not applicable
because there was no intentional relinquishment of known rights in
view of the fact that the insurer was ignorant of the insured's fraud
prior to filing the SR-21 form. Perhaps Wisconsin would concur with
the position adopted in the Hoosier case, and if such a contingency
arose hold that a filing by the insurer would not be voluntary.
On the other hand, if the policy were issued in the absence of
fraud, and thereafter the insured misrepresented the facts pertaining
to the accident, the result would probably remain the same. This is
particularly true in view of the fact that the ordinary, policy makes
notice of the accident, and a full and fair disclosure of the facts, a con-
dition precedent. This result was attained in Hunt v. Dollar.'9 A mis-
representation as to pre-accident intoxication by the insured to the in-
surer, blocked the injured party's recovery from the insurer. The rule
had existed that such conduct by the insured would void the policy as to
the insured. 20 This case extended the rule so as to abrogate an innocent
third party's claim against the insurer, due to the misconduct of the
insured, upon the ground that the rights of the beneficiary are limited
by the terms of the contract. Admittedly, such a condition could be
waived, 21 but should an insurer be held to have waived a right of which
he had no knowledge due to the fraud of the insured? It is doubtful
that the court would read waiver into such a situation.2
filing will not relieve it from liability. Such is not the type of mistake with
which we are dealing in the Laughnan case."
's Hoosier Cas. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind. v. Fox, 102 F.Supp. 214 (E.D. Iowa
1952).
19 224 Wis. 48, 271 N.W. 405 (1937).
20 Hoffman v. Labutzke, 233 Wis. 365, 289 N.W. 652 (1940).
21 Bachhuber v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 574, 229 N.W. 117 (1930).
22 See: Wisconsin Transp. Co. v. Great Lakes Cas. Co., 241 Wis. 523, 6 N.W.2d
708 (1942); 29 Am. JUR., INSURANCE §878; 38 A.L.R. 2d 1170, Liability Insur-
ance Waiver-Estoppel, supplementing 81 A.L.R. 1J68; Buckner v. General
Casualty Co., 207 Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932).
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Ordinarily, the insurer can preserve any available policy defenses
by sending a non-waiver notice, 2 and thereby gain freedom of conduct
without risk of waiver. Further, such notice obviates the possibility
of waiver notwithstanding the lack of consent to the non-waiver on the
part of either the insured24 or the injured party.2 5 This is no solution
though, since the authorized SR-21 form provides for no such con-
tingency and it is questionable if the Commissioner would accept a
form qualified by an inserted non-waiver clause as a compliance with
the statute.
The Iowa court in the Hoosier case considered at length the feasi-
bility of estoppel, and concluded that the doctrine was not applicable.
They stated the elements of estoppel in pais to be:
"(1) an act or representation on the part of the one against
whom the estoppel is invoked, (2) with the intention that reli-
ance should be placed on such act or representation, (3) justifi-
able reliance on the same, and (4) prejudice resulting from
such reliance."2 6
In general, filing the SR-21 form would satisfy the first three
elements: 1) filing the form constitutes the act or representation;
2) filing the form would also indicate an intention to be bound ;27
and 3) in view of the fact that the form is a public record, the injured
party should be justified in relying thereon. However, the fourth
element is not to be readily conceded. In the Wisconsin cases under
consideration, as well as in the Hoosier decision, the insurer argued
that there was no prejudicial reliance on the part of the injured party
because the injury had occurred prior to the filing of the form, and
with or without the form, the injury would be the same. This con-
tention was not passed upon in either the Laughnan or the Prisuda
decisions, but was adopted in the Hoosier case. Generally, estoppel is
not to be found where the insurer merely remains silent as to lia-
bility,28 or where an adjusting agent investigates the claim. 29 However,
where the insurer erroneously inserts a statement into the policy with-
out inquiry; 3° or with knowledge of facts taking the injury outside
23 Guardianship of Schneider, 244 Wis. 323, 12 N.W.2d 138 (1943); Wisconsin
Transp. Co. v. Great Lakes Cas. Co., supra, note 22; United States Guarantee
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Wis. 317, 12 N.W.2d 59 (1943), and cases
there cited.
2438 A.L.R. 2d 1175, supra, note 22, supplementing 81 A.L.R. 1397; 29 Am. JUR.,
INSURANcE §879.
25 38 A.L.R. 2d 1177, supra, note 22.
26 See also: Pfuehler v. General Casualty Ins. Co., supra, note 11; Welch v. Fire
Association, 120 Wis. 456, 98 N.W. 227 (1904); Jungdorf v. Little Rice, 156
Wis. 466, 145 N.W. 1092 (1914); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee, supra,
note 12.27 See Justice Currie's concurring opinion in the Prisuda case, supra, note 17.
28 Woodward v. German-American Ins. Co., 128 Wis. 1, 106 N.W. 681 (1906) ; but
see: Moller v. J. L. Gates Land Co., 119 Wis. 548, 97 N.W. 174 (1903).
29 Pfuehler v. General Casualty Ins. Co., supra, note 11.
30 Emmco Ins. Co. v. Palatine Ins. Co., 263 Wis. 558, 58 N.W.2d 525 (1953).
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the policy, undertakes to assist the insured in defending an action
without a reservation of rights,31 estoppel has normally been applicable.
In the latter two situations there is little difficulty in finding a detri-
mental reliance, either in the form of change of position, or expense
and inconvenience that has been occasioned by the conduct of the
insurer.32 Hence, if in some manner the injured party were prejudiced
by reasonably relying on the SR-21 it would seem to follow that the
doctrine of estoppel in pais should be invoked; however, in the usual
case it might prove difficult to find such detrimental reliance. The
injured party in the Laughnan case argued that he had ceased his
investigation upon discovering the SR-21, but in view of the fact that
such contention went without comment by the court, and further that
there was no alleged prejudicial reliance in the Prisuda case, it would
seem that the presence or absence of any detrimental reliance is not a
significant factor, i.e., that the court is not utilizing the doctrine of
estoppel.
In conclusion, it is submitted that an SR-21 form constitutes more
than a mere admission against interest, and that the court is applying
the theory of waiver, rather than estoppel, if in fact the court is tacitly
employing either doctrine. However, in the event of fraud on the
part of either the insured or the injured party, it seems unlikely that
the insurer would be precluded from denying liability on the policy.33
JOHN A. HANSEN
Wills-Partial Revocation-In the recent decision of Will of
Mattes,' a son took a share in his father's estate, notwithstanding
the son had been entirely omitted from his father's will. Arthur M.
Mattes executed his will leaving the entire residue to his wife, Meta,
entirely omitting a living son by a former marriage.2 When the will
was presented to probate, the son filed an objection claiming he was
omitted by mistake and should have the same share in his father's
estate as if his father had left no will according to Wis. STATS. (1953)
§238.11 which states:
"Provision for child omitted by mistake, etc. When any testa-
tor shall omit to provide in his will for any of his children or
for the issue of any deceased child, and it shall appear that such
omission was made by mistake or accident, such child or the
3138 A.L.R. 2d 1151, supra, note 22; but see: Fitzgerald v Milwaukee Automobile
Ins. Co., 226 Wis. 520, 277 N.W. 183 (1938).
32 Fraser v. Aetna Iife Ins. Co., 114 Wis. 510, 90 N.W. 476 (1902).
33 Supra, notes 19 and 21; Koerts v. Grand Lodge, Herman's Sons, 119 Wis. 520,
97 N.W. 163 (1903) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moldenhaurer, 193 F2d 663 (7th Cir.,
1952) ; Matlock v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 109 P.2d 119 (1941).
'268 Wis. 447, 68 N.W.2d 18 (1955).
2 Two specific bequests were made. They are not material here.
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